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I. INTRODUCTION 
New Jersey has some of the United States’ strongest consumer 
protection laws.1  One of the most lauded by consumer advocates is the 
Consumer Fraud Act (CFA).2  When the CFA was enacted in 1960, it was 
intended to be “one of the strongest consumer protection laws in the 
nation.”3  To maintain its position, the CFA has had an uninterrupted 
history “of constant expansion of consumer protection.”4  One such 
manifestation was another New Jersey consumer protection statute, the 
New Jersey Truth-In-Consumer-Contract Warranty and Notice Act 
(“TCCWNA”).5 
Enacted in 1981 by the New Jersey State Legislature, the TCCWNA 
was signed into law in 1982 by Governor Brendan Byrne.6  The 
governor’s signing statement indicated that the TCCWNA was enacted 
to help “strengthen[ ] provisions of the [CFA].”7  The TCCWNA does 
not create any new consumer rights.8  Instead, the TCCWNA has two 
main goals: prevention and ensuring consumers are aware about their 
existing rights.  First, the TCCWNA focuses on prevention by prohibiting 
businesses from using terms in their consumer contracts, warranties, 
signs, and notices that include “provision[s] that violate[] any clearly 
established legal right of a consumer.”9  Those “clearly established legal 
right[s]” include rights established under other consumer protection 
 
 1  See Pro v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., No. 06-CV-3830, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
100181, at *13-14 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2008) (“New Jersey law is one of the most protective 
consumer fraud laws in the United States.”). 
 2  The CFA safeguards consumers by making it an unlawful practice for sellers of 
merchandise or real estate to engage in “any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, 
fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, 
suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such 
concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of [such] 
merchandise or real estate[.]”  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 
319-321, 323, 325, 328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24). 
 3  Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Huffmaster v. 
Robinson, 534 A.2d 435, 437-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 4  Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 364 (N.J. 1997). 
 5  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-18 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 
328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24). 
 6  Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 427 (2013); The Truth About TCCWNA, 
N.J. CIVIL JUST. INST. (Nov. 5, 2016), http://www.civiljusticenj.org/issues/the-truth-about-
tccwna/.  The New Jersey Civil Justice Institute advocates for a civil justice system that treats 
all parties fairly and discourages lawsuit abuse.  Id. 
 7  Statement from Brendan Byrne, Governor of New Jersey, on the Signing of Assembly 
Bill No. 1660 (Jan. 11, 1982). 
 8  See § 56:12-18. 
 9  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-15 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328-
330, 340 and J.R. No. 24). 
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statutes, such as the CFA.10  Second, the TCCWNA focuses on promoting 
consumer awareness by requiring sellers who conduct their business 
inside and outside of New Jersey to clearly specify in their contracts, 
signs and notices which provisions are “void, inapplicable, or 
unenforceable in New Jersey.”11  This means that sellers are forbidden 
from using “void where prohibited” clauses in their contracts, signs, and 
notices.12 
The most notable difference between the TCCWNA and New 
Jersey’s CFA is that the TCCWNA provides a private right of action for 
consumers and prospective consumers without having to establish an 
actual injury.13  To state a claim under the CFA, a plaintiff must allege:  
(1) unlawful conduct by the defendants; (2) an ascertainable loss on the 
part of the plaintiff; and (3) a causal relationship between the defendant’s 
unlawful conduct and the [p]laintiffs’ ascertainable loss.14  Alternatively 
the TCCWNA contains no ascertainable loss requirement, which 
necessitates that any type of damage suffered must be quantifiable or 
measurable.15  Therefore, to succeed on a TCCWNA claim, a plaintiff 
does not need to show that the inclusion of an invalid provision or a “void 
where prohibited” clause in a contract, sign, or notice caused him or her 
to suffer a financial loss or injury of any kind.16  This lack of an 
ascertainable loss requirement lowers the bar for plaintiff’s attorneys to 
bring and succeed on TCCWNA claims compared to actions filed under 
the CFA. 
After the TCCWNA was signed into law in 1982, it remained 
dormant for many years.17  In fact, the statute was not mentioned in a 
written opinion until 1997.18  The TCCWNA gained prominence in 2009 
 
 10  See id.  “Clearly established legal rights” can include both those contained in New 
Jersey and federal consumer protection statutes.  Id. 
 11  Shelton, 70 A.3d at 549.  
 12  Kendall v. CubeSmart L.P., No. 15-6098, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53668, at *27 
(D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2016). 
 13  See United Consumer Fin. Servs. Co. v. Carbo, 982 A.2d 7, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2009).  The court held that, even though “[t]here [was] no evidence that any consumer 
was dissatisfied with the. . . purchase[,] attempted to exercise and was denied the right to 
rescind or was charged a fee for submitting a check or other instrument for payment that was 
subsequently dishonored[,]” the consumers still had a private right to action under the 
TCCWNA. 
 14  Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 202 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Cox v. Sears 
Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 465 (N.J. 1994)). 
 15  See Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz, USA, LLC, 872 A.2d 783, 793 (N.J. 2005). 
 16  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-15 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328-
330, 340 and J.R. No. 24). 
 17  The Truth About TCCWNA, supra note 6 (“[TCCWNA] lay dormant for many 
years . . . .”). 
 18  See Alloway v. General Marine Indus., L.P., 695 A.2d 264, 274 (N.J. 1997). 
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when the New Jersey Appellate Division applied the statute to class 
action lawsuits.  That year, the Appellate Division held in United 
Consumer Financial Services Co. v. Carbo that proof of ascertainable 
loss was not necessary in order for a plaintiff to bring a class action under 
TCCWNA.19  The plaintiff class in Carbo consisted of 16,845 consumers 
who had purchased “Kirby” vacuum cleaners.20  The class members 
brought a claim that the “notices of cancellation” contained in the 
vacuum’s retail contract violated New Jersey’s Retail Installment Sales 
Act.21  There was no evidence presented at trial that any consumer was 
“dissatisfied with the Kirby purchased, attempted to exercise and was 
denied the right to rescind or was charged a fee for submitting a check or 
other instrument for payment that was subsequently dishonored.”22  
Despite any ascertainable loss, the TCCWNA violation required United 
Consumer Financial Services Company to pay all 16,845 class members 
a statutory penalty of $100 each, totaling $1,684,500, plus attorneys’ fees 
and court costs.23 
Ultimately, the Carbo decision not only expanded the reach of the 
TCCWNA, but opened the door for other plaintiffs to bring class actions.  
The effects of Carbo are evident in the number of TCCWNA cases that 
followed the decision.  The frequency of TCCWNA cases rose from only 
two to three per year to dozens being decided each year.24 
However, the TCCWNA’s application to online commerce is 
arguably a more significant expansion of the statute.  In 2013, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey decided in Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc. 
that online coupons were considered “property” under the TCCWNA. 
Therefore, an online coupon’s terms and conditions could not contain a 
provision that violated an established consumer right or contain a “void 
where prohibited” clause.25  Shelton’s holding opened the floodgates for 
e-commerce-based TCCWNA class actions with plaintiffs, many times 
the same ones, preying upon unsuspecting nation-wide retailer’s online 
 
 19  United Consumer Fin. Servs. Co. v. Carbo, 982 A.2d 7, 30 (N.J. App. Div. 2009).  
 20  Id. at 14. 
 21  Id.  
 22  Id. at 15. 
 23  Id. at 24-25.  See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-17 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 
319-321, 323, 325, 328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24) (“[A]ny person who violates the provisions 
of this act shall be liable to the aggrieved consumer for a civil penalty of not less than $100.00 
or for actual damages . . . together with reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs”).  
 24  See The Truth About TCCWNA, supra note 6.  The chart on the New Jersey Civil 
Justice Institute’s webpage titled “TCCWNA Decisions” demonstrates the rapid increase of 
TCCWNA claims after 2009. 
 25  Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 70 A.3d 544, 555 (N.J. 2013).  Under the TCCWNA, 
a consumer is “any individual who buys, leases, borrows, or bails any money, property or 
service which is primarily for personal, family or household purposes.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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terms and conditions.26 
Plaintiffs are targeting online terms and conditions through 
TCCWNA’s section 16.27  Section 16 requires a consumer contract, 
 
 26  Alan Brahamsha is the named plaintiff in three TCCWNA actions against Redbox 
Automated Retail LLC, Supercell Oy, and Starbucks Corporation.  Anne Bucher, Starbucks, 
Redbox Class Actions Say Contracts Don’t Comply With NJ Law, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Sept. 
17, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/345453-starbucks-
redbox-class-actions-say-contracts-dont-comply-nj-law/; Paul Tassin, Clash of Clans Class 
Action Says Terms of Service Violates N.J. Law, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Nov. 15, 2016), 
https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/349409-clash-of-clans-class-ac 
tion-says-terms-of-service-violates-n-j-law/.  Aaron Rubin, Fay Rubin, and/or Fruma Rubin 
are the named plaintiffs in TCCWNA lawsuits filed against Inuit Inc., Saks Direct Inc., and J 
Crew Group, Inc.  Paul Tassin, Intuit Class Action Claims Turbotax Violates N.J. Consumer 
Laws, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 14, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/la 
wsuit-news/332835-intuit-class-action-claims-turbotax-violates-n-j-consumer-laws/; Tamara 
Burns, Saks Class Action Claims Website Terms Violate State Law,  TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 
29, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/334028-saks-websit 
e-terms-conditions-violate-state-law-class-action-lawsuit-claims/; Christina Davis, J.Crew 
Class Action Alleges Website Terms Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (May 4, 2016), https://topcla 
ssactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/334462-j-crew-class-action-alleges-webiste 
-terms-illegal/.  Ryan Russell is the named plaintiff against Advance Auto Parts Inc., Clawfoot 
Supply LLC, and Croscill Home.  Paul Tassin, Advance Auto Parts Class Action Says Website 
Terms Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (May 16, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-
settlements/lawsuit-news/335407-advance-auto-parts-class-action-says-website-terms-illega 
l/; Tim Darragh, Those Terms and Conditions (That Noone Reads) Could Cost NJ Retailers,  
NEW JERSEY REAL TIME NEWS (Aug. 18, 2016, 9:55 AM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/ 
2016/08/those_terms_and_conditions_that_nobody_reads_could.html.  Darla Braden is a 
plaintiff in cases against Staples and TTI Floor North America.  Robert Boumis, Staples Class 
Action Say Website’s Terms of Service Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (July 1, 2016), https://topc 
lassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/339130-staples-class-action-says-websites 
terms-of-service-illegal/; Anne Bucher, Hoover Faces Class Action Lawsuit Over “Unfair” 
Terms and Conditions, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Feb. 16, 2015), https://topclassactions.com/laws 
uit-settlements/lawsuit-news/328221-hoover-faces-class-action-lawsuit-over-unfair-terms-
conditions/.  Lucia Candelario is the named plaintiff against Vita-Mix Corporation and 
Whirlpool Corporation.  Tamara Burns, Whirlpool Class Action Alleges Website Illegal Terms 
of Use, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (May 23, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/l 
awsuit-news/336001-whirlpool-class-action-alleges-website-illegal-terms-use/.  Norris Hite 
is the named plaintiff against Lush Cosmetics and The Finish Line Inc.  Ashley Milano, Lush 
Cosmetics Class Action Says Website’s “Terms of Use” Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Mar. 23 
, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/331043-lush-cosmetic 
s-class-action-says-website-terms-of-use-illegal/; Daniel Fisher, Creative Lawyers Give New 
Meaning To The Term “Warranty Claim”, FORBES (June 3, 2016, 11:41 AM), https://www.fo 
rbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2016/06/03/never-mind-defective-products-now-lawyers-are-sui 
ng-over-the-warranty/2/#13a26d1e4f36.  Bronwyn Nahas is the named plaintiff against 
Hatworld Inc. and L Brands Inc.  Ashley Milano, HatWorld, Poptropica Class Action 
Lawsuits Filed Over Website Terms, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (May 2, 2016), https://topclassactio 
ns.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/334194-hatworld-poptropica-class-action-lawsuits 
-filed-over-website-terms/; Michael Kakuk, Victoria’s Secret Class Action Alleges Website 
Terms Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 20, 2016),  https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-
settlements/lawsuit-news/333225-victorias-secret-class-action-alleges-website-terms-illegal.  
 27  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-16 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328-
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notice, or sign to “clearly identify which provisions are void, 
inapplicable, or unenforceable in New Jersey.”28  Therefore, if a seller’s 
website’s terms and conditions uses a “void where prohibited” clause and 
fails to specify which provisions are void, inapplicable, or unenforceable 
in New Jersey, that seller is in violation of the TCCWNA.29 
Section 16 and the lack of an ascertainable loss requirement is why 
TCCWNA class actions can be financially treacherous for businesses.  To 
succeed in a TCCWNA claim, plaintiffs do not need to show that a “void 
where prohibited clause” harmed them, only that it was present in the 
contract, notice, or sign.  This light burden of proof can be extremely 
costly for businesses engaging in e-commerce since thousands, or even 
millions, of customers or potential customers can be exposed to a 
website’s terms and conditions.30 
In 2016, at least a dozen cases were filed, which claimed that website 
terms and conditions violated the TCCWNA, including suits against 
Apple, Advanced Auto Parts, Bed, Bath & Beyond, Burlington Coat 
Factory, Sony, Toys ‘R’ Us, Wyndham, and Victoria’s Secret.31  As a 
 
330, 340 and J.R. No. 24). 
 28  Shelton, 70 A.3d at 549. 
 29  Id. 
 30  See, e.g., Defendant’s Notice of Removal at 1, Huhn v. Facebook Inc., No. 
2:16cv03681 (D.N.J. filed June 22, 2016) (discussing the Plaintiffs’ proposed class consists 
of over four million Facebook users in New Jersey with statutory damages for a TCCWNA 
claim at $100 per person; meaning Facebook could have to pay over $400 million in punitive 
damages, plus attorney’s fees for the “void where prohibited” clause in Facebook’s terms and 
conditions). 
 31  See Silkowski v. Apple Inc., No 5:16cv02338 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 28, 2016).  See 
Paul Tassin, Apple Class Action Alleges ID Agreement Violates N.J. Law, TOP CLASS ACTIONS 
(May 3, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/334348-apple- 
class-action-alleges-id-agreement-violates-nj-law/; Russell v. Advance Auto Parts Inc., No. 
3:16cv02685 (D.N.J. filed May 12, 2016).  See Paul Tassin, Advance Auto Parts Class Action 
Says Website Terms Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (May 16, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/ 
lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/335407-advance-auto-parts-class-action-says-website-ter 
ms-illegal/; Sweeney v. Bed Bath & Beyond LLC, No. 2:16-cv01927 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 6, 
2016).  See Paul Tassin, Bed Bath and Beyond Lawsuit Shouldn’t Be Dismissed, Class Says, 
TOP CLASS ACTIONS (July 13, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-
news/339862-bed-bath-beyond-lawsuit-shouldnt-dismissed-class-says/; Martinez v. Burlingt 
on Stores Inc., No. 1:16cv02064 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 13, 2016).  See Tamara Burns, Burlington 
Coat Factory Class Action Targets Website’s Terms, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/333001-burlington-coat-factor 
y-class-action-targets-websites-terms/; Farrell et al. v. Sony Corp. et al., No. 2:16cv04391 
(D.N.J. filed July , 2016); Roldan v. Toys R US Inc., No. 2:16cv01929 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 6, 
2016). Anne Bucher, Torys R Us, Bed Bath and Beyond Class Actions Filed Over Website 
Terms, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 11, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/l 
awsuit-news/332489-toys-r-us-bed-bath-beyond-class-actions-filed-over-website-terms/.  
See Luca v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. et al., No. 2:16cv00746, (W.D. Pa. filed June 6, 
2016).  See Tamara Burns, Wyndham Class Action Lawsuit Claims ‘Resort Fees’ Are Illegal, 
TOP CLASS ACTIONS (June 8, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-
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result, businesses engaging in e-commerce are seeking relief from 
TCCWNA class actions in federal court by challenging the law on Article 
III standing grounds.32 
In federal courts, businesses are seeking dismissal through Article 
III standing arguments based on the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, which raised the bar for standing requirements.33  
Spokeo’s website listed personal information about individuals such as 
how to contact them, their current marital status, and occupation.34  
Robins, without alleging harm or imminent harm, claimed that Spokeo 
violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) because the information 
the company published about him was false.35  The complaint was 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.36  Robins amended his 
complaint and stated the false information Spokeo posted about him 
harmed his future employment opportunities.37  The complaint was 
dismissed again for failure to state an injury in fact.38 
Robins appealed and asserted that he had an injury that would 
qualify him for standing under Article III of the United States 
Constitution.39  The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s holding 
and Spokeo was granted a writ of certiorari by the United States Supreme 
Court.40  The Supreme Court held that Congress or any state legislative 
body could not eliminate standing requirements by “statutorily granting 
the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”41  
 
news/337307-wyndham-class-action-lawsuit-claims-resort-fees-illegal/; Nahas v. L Brands, 
Inc., No. 2:16cv02107 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 15, 2016).  See Michael Kakuk, Victoria’s Secret 
Class Action Alleges Website Terms Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 20, 2016), https://topcl 
assactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/333225-victorias-secret-class-action-allege 
s-website-terms-illegal/.  See Guzman v. Devils Arena Entertainment, No. 2:16cv01984 
(D.N.J. filed Apr. 8, 2016); Rubin v. Intuit Inc., No. 3:16cv02029 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 12, 2016).  
See Paul Tassin, Intuit Class Action Claims Turbotax Violates N.J. Consumer Laws, TOP 
CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 14, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-
news/332835-intuit-class-action-claims-turbotax-violates-n-j-consumer-laws/; Hite et al. v. 
Lush Cosmetics LLC, No. 1:16cv01533 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2016).  See Ashley Milano, Lush 
Cosmetics Class Action Says Website’s “Terms of Use” Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Mar. 23 
, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/331043-lush-cosmetic 
s-class-action-says-website-terms-of-use-illegal/. 
 32  See, e.g., Hecht v. Hertz Corp., No. 2:16-cv-01485, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145589, 
at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2016). 
 33  Spokeo Inc. v. Robbin, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547-48 (2016). 
 34  Id. at 1544. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. at 1554. 
 38  Id. at 1544. 
 39  Spokeo Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1546. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. 
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Ultimately, the Court opined that to achieve standing for an injury in fact, 
a plaintiff needs to show that the injury caused “concrete and 
particularized harm.”42  Concrete injuries are those that are real and not 
abstract.43  Particularized harm can be shown if an injury affects “the 
plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”44 
These new standards conflict with the TCCWNA because the statute 
does not require ascertainable loss in order to bring a claim.45  For 
example, the plaintiff in Hecht v. Hertz, a recent New Jersey District 
Court case, alleged that the defendant violated TCCWNA because its 
website’s terms and conditions did not state whether New Jersey was a 
jurisdiction where certain exceptions applied.46  The court dismissed the 
complaint, noting that the plaintiff “[did] not allege that he even viewed 
(let alone relied upon to his detriment) either of these sections of Hertz’s 
website.”47  Additionally, the court explained that the plaintiff’s 
arguments only presented “bare procedural harm, divorced from any 
concrete harm,” which cannot “satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of 
Article III.”48  The Hertz holding has gained significant traction in federal 
courts.  In recent months, numerous TCCWNA claims were dismissed 
for failing to meet the requirements of Spokeo.49  These dismissals may 
lead to more plaintiffs filing TCCWNA claims in state court. 
Besides not meeting Article III standing requirements, another 
reason the TCCWNA is constitutionally deficient is because the statute 
imposes an excessive burden upon interstate commerce.  Recently, the 
TCCWNA was challenged for the first time as a violation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.50  In April 2016, a TCCWNA class action was 
brought against the technology giant, Apple, for its “to the extent not 
prohibited by law” clause contained in its iTunes terms and conditions.51  
 
 42  Id. at 1549. 
 43  Id. at 1548. 
 44  Id. 
 45  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-15 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328-
330, 340 and J.R. No. 24). 
 46  Hecht v. Hertz Corp., No. 2:16-cv-01485, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145589, at *4 
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2016). 
 47  Id. 
 48  Id. at *10. 
 49  See Rubin v. J. Crew Group, Inc., No.16-2167, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46389, at 22 
(D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2017); Hite v. Lush Internet Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 444, 455 (D.N.J. 2017); 
Russell v. Croscill Home, LLC, No. 16cv1190, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159787, slip op. at 1 
(D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2016); Candelario v. Rip Curl, Inc., No. 16cv00963, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
163019, *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2016) (dismissing complaint alleging a TCCWNA violation of 
website terms and conditions because the plaintiff lacked Article III standing under Spokeo). 
 50  Silkowski v. Apple Inc., No. 3:16cv2338, 3:14-15 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 1, 2016).  
Tassin, supra note 31. 
 51  Id. 
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The potential class of New Jersey iTunes users could be in the millions.52  
In response, Apple argued in a July 2016 motion-to-dismiss in Silkowski 
v. Apple Inc. that “extending the TCCWNA to Internet services imposes 
an excessive burden on interstate commerce,”53 violating the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.  As of publication, the District Court of Northern 
California has not ruled on the motion. 
Nevertheless, this Note argues that the TCCWNA violates the 
Dormant Commerce Clause because the TCCWNA’s Section 16 fails the 
Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test.54  The balancing test states: “[w]here 
a statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will 
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”55  This Note asserts 
that the burden placed upon sellers with a nation-wide reach is excessive 
in relation to the benefit of consumers’ knowledge of their existing rights. 
II. HISTORY OF THE TCCWNA AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A. The TCCWNA 
i. The Legislative History of the TCCWNA 
The legislative history of the TCCWNA is limited.  It was originally 
introduced to the New Jersey Senate on May 1, 1980 as Bill No. 1660.56  
Assemblyman Byron Baer’s Sponsor’s Statement reads: 
Far too many consumer contracts, warranties, notices and 
signs contain provisions [that] clearly violate the rights of 
consumers. Even though these provisions are legally invalid 
or unenforceable, their very inclusion in a contract, warranty, 
notice or sign deceives a consumer into thinking that they are 
enforceable and for this reason the consumer often fails to 
enforce his rights.57 
The Sponsor’s Statement highlights that “the proposed legislation 
[TCCWNA] did not recognize any new consumer rights but merely 
imposed an obligation on sellers to acknowledge clearly established 
consumer rights and provided remedies for posting or inserting 
 
 52  Nina Ulloa, iTunes Has 800 Million Accounts. . . And 800 Million Credit Card 
Numbers. . ., DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2014 
04/24/itunes800m/; see also New Jersey Population, WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldp 
opulationreview.com/states/new-jersey-population/ (last visited May 10, 2018). 
 53  Silkowski v. Apple Inc., No 5:16cv02338 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 28, 2016). 
 54  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-16 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 
328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24); see also Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 55  Id. 
 56  Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 70 A.3d 544, 552 (N.J. 2013).  
 57  Assem. B. 1660, 199 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1980). 
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provisions contrary to law.”58  These “clearly established consumer 
rights” include those in the CFA and other New Jersey and federal laws.59  
The Sponsor’s statement additionally demonstrates that the Legislature 
hoped to prevent consumer deception and give consumers another option 
to assert their rights against businesses from which they purchased 
products or services. 
As the bill moved through the New Jersey State Legislature, the 
remedies portion of the TCCWNA was amended.  The original bill 
contained the phrase “civil damages” in Section 4, line 3, but the final bill 
replaced that phrase with “civil penalty.”60  The statement by the 
Commerce, Industry & Professions Committee accompanying the new 
version of the bill reads 
Section 4, as amended by the committee, provides that a 
business which violates the provisions of this bill would be 
liable to the aggrieved consumer for a civil penalty of not less 
than $100 if the consumer was not injured by such a violation 
and for a civil penalty and actual damages if he was injured 
by such a violation.61 
It is clear from the amendment that the New Jersey State Legislature 
wanted to favor consumers by including a statutory penalty in order to 
deter and punish offending sellers. 
After the remedies section was amended, the TCCWNA was enacted 
by the New Jersey State Legislature in 1981.62  A short time later, the bill 
was signed into law by Governor Byrne on January 11, 1982.63  In his 
signing statement, the governor reinforced the notion that the TCCWNA 
was not enacted to create any new consumer rights or seller 
responsibilities, but instead to bolster the CFA rights and those 
established in other laws.64 
ii. The Text of the TCCWNA 
TCCWNA, N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 states: 
No seller . . . shall in the course of his business offer to any 
 
 58  Shelton, 70 A.3d at 552. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-15 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 
317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24).  See also § 56:12-16 (Westlaw through 
L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24).  
 59  § 56:12-15. 
 60  See Assemb. B. 1660, 199 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1980); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
56:17-18 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 
24). 
 61  Assem. B. 1660, 199 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1980). 
 62  Shelton, 70 A.2d. at 549. 
 63  Statement from Brendan Byrne, Governor of New Jersey, on the Signing of Assembly 
Bill No. 1660 (Jan. 11, 1982). 
 64  See id. (stating that the TCCWNA’s purpose was to help “strengthen[ ] provisions of 
the [CFA].”). 
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consumer or prospective consumer or enter into any written 
consumer contract or give or display any written consumer 
warranty, notice or sign . . . which includes any provision that 
violates any clearly established legal right of a consumer or 
responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee as 
established by State or Federal law at the time the offer is 
made or the consumer contract is signed or the warranty, 
notice or sign is given or displayed.65 
In short, these sections of the statute create no new rights for consumers.  
Instead, Sections 12-15 bar businesses from including terms in consumer 
contracts, offers, or notices that violate “clearly established rights.”66  A 
court decides whether a clearly established right is violated by 
“assess[ing] whether the CFA or another consumer protection statute or 
regulation clearly prohibited the contractual provision or other practice 
that is the basis for the TCCWNA claim.”67 
TCCWNA’s Section 16 prohibits any provision in a consumer 
contract that requires a consumer to waive his or her rights under the 
Act.68  Section 16 contains a specification requirement that calls for a 
seller’s contracts, notices, or signs to clearly identify “which provisions 
are or are not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New 
Jersey.”69  This clause forbids blanket invalidity provisions in contracts, 
notice, or signs.70  These provisions are called “savings language” and 
examples of such language include: “where permitted by law,” 
“maximum amount allowed by law,” or “unless prohibited by law.”71  
Therefore, if a seller seeks to comply with Section 16, it needs to modify 
its contracts and notices to remove blanket invalidity provisions. 
Furthermore, Section 16’s specification requirement applies only 
when a consumer contract, notice, or sign “is or may be used in multiple 
jurisdictions.”72  If a consumer contract, notice, or sign is created only for 
 
 65  § 56:12-15. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 69 (2017).  See, e.g., Mladenov v. Wegmans 
Food Mkts. Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 360, 380 (D.N.J. 2015) (holding that plaintiffs who failed 
to state viable claims under CFA or federal food labeling regulation established no violation 
of “clearly established legal right” under TCCWNA); United Consumer Fin. Servs. Co. v. 
Carbo, 410 N.J. Super. 280, 305 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (applying TCCWNA based 
on violation of “clearly established” right under Retail Installment Sales Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17:16C-50). 
 68  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-16 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328-
330, 340 and J.R. No. 24). 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Kendall v. CubeSmart L.P., No. 15-6098, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53668, at *27 
(D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2016). 
 72  Id.; see also Walters v. Dream Cars Nat’l, LLC, No. BER-L-9571-14, 2016 N.J. Super. 
Unpub. LEXIS 498, at *16 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 7, 2016) (“[I]f a consumer contract 
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use in New Jersey and controlled by New Jersey law, the specification 
requirement in Section 16 does not apply.73  The court in Kendall stated 
that it would be “redundant” to explain which provisions may or may not 
be enforceable under New Jersey law, and that “when the contract, notice, 
or sign is a New Jersey-specific document, the savings language ‘merely 
operates as a severability clause, protecting the remainder of the contract 
should some portion of it be declared void or unenforceable.’”74 
In addition to clarifying Section 16’s application, the Kendall court 
created three requirements that a plaintiff must meet in order state a claim 
under the clause.  For a Section 16 violation under the TCCWNA, a 
plaintiff must allege the following: 
(1) The existence of consumer contract, notice, or sign that is 
or may be used in multiple jurisdictions; (2) which states, 
either expressly or implicitly, that any of its provisions may 
be void, unenforceable, or inapplicable in some jurisdictions; 
and, (3) that the consumer contract, notice or sign fails to 
specify which provisions are or are not void, unenforceable, 
or inapplicable in New Jersey.75 
If a plaintiff fails to satisfy all three requirements, the TCCWNA 
claim under Section 16 fails. 
The final sections of the TCCWNA are 17 and 18, which describe 
the remedies available to consumers who had their rights violated under 
the statute: “Any person, who violates the provisions of the statute shall 
be liable to an aggrieved consumer for a civil penalty not less than $100, 
actual damages, or both at the election of the consumer, in addition to 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs.”76 The remedies are plaintiff 
friendly, especially for those who choose to bring a TCCWNA claim as 
a class action.77 Unfortunately, for defendants, these claims can be costly, 
especially in a class action with a proposed class of consumers or 
potential consumers in the thousands or millions.78 
 
is or may be used in multiple jurisdictions and expressly states that any of its provisions are 
or may be void, unenforceable, or inapplicable in certain of those jurisdictions, the contract 
must specify how these provisions are void, unenforceable, or inapplicable in New Jersey.”).  
 73  Castro v. Sovran Self Storage, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 204, 213 (D.N.J. 2015) (holding 
that the defendant’s rental agreement only applied to New Jersey so there was no indication 
that the provision at issue contemplated the contract’s application in multiple jurisdictions 
such that its enforceability in New Jersey must be clarified). 
 74  Id. (quoting Castro, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 213). 
 75  Kendall, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53668, at *28. 
 76  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-17 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328-
330, 340 and J.R. No. 24). 
 77  David F. Katz & Elizabeth K. Hinson, Plaintiffs Target Online Retailers’ Website 
Terms & Conditions in Consumer Class Actions Brought under New Jersey Consumer 
Protection Law, LEXOLOGY, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b68f5f68-ea83-
43b6-9c86-74a6f8ea83a2 (last visited May 10, 2018). 
 78  Alloway v. General Marine Indus., L.P., 695 A.2d 264 (N.J. 1997). 
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B. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The United States Constitution’s Commerce Clause allows 
Congress “to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States.”79  The Commerce Clause both grants “regulatory power 
to Congress” and “denies the States the power to unjustifiably 
discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of 
commerce.”80  This denial of state power or “negative” application of the 
Commerce Clause is called the Dormant Commerce Clause.81  The 
purpose of the Dormant Commerce Clause is to “create an area of trade 
free from interference by the States,” and to prevent States from 
“jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole” by “plac[ing] burdens 
on the flow of commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within 
those borders would not bear.”82 
There are two theoretical justifications for the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.  The primary justification is grounded in economic efficiency.  
The Dormant Commerce Clause safeguards free trade among the states, 
which secures the associated economic benefits.83  The secondary 
justification is that the clause protects out-of-state actors who are 
burdened by a state’s regulation but lack a voice in the political process 
of the state imposing the burden.84 
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state statute may 
discriminate against interstate commerce in two ways:  facially or in its 
practical effect.85  First, a state statute facially discriminates when there 
is “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests 
that benefits the former and burdens the latter. . . .”86  This form of 
 
 79   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 80  Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994). 
 81  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1791 (2015) (quoting 
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995)). 
 82  See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. at 180. 
 83  See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); New Energy Co. v. 
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273- 74 (1988); Daniel A. Garber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade 
and the Regulatory State: A GATT’s-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. 
L. REV. 1401, 1406 (1994); Donald H. Reagan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: 
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986). 
 84  See, e.g., South Carolina v. Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S. 177, 185 n. 2 (1938); Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 n. 2 (1945); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 205-06 (1980); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant 
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 439 (1982). 
 85  Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 785 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 86  United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
338 (2007).  See also Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich. PSC, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005); Fort 
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep’t of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359 
(1992).  
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discrimination will be subject to “strict scrutiny” by the courts and is 
likely to be found invalid per se.87 
Second, a state statute may discriminate in its practical effect even 
“if a statute regulates evenhandedly and only indirectly affects interstate 
commerce.”88  In this instance of discrimination, the standards for 
scrutiny are less rigorous, and a court is more likely to defer to the 
judgment of a state’s legislature.89 
To determine whether discrimination exists, courts will apply the 
balancing test established in Pike v. Bruce Church: “Where the statute 
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, 
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive 
about the putative local benefits.”90  If there is no legitimate local 
purpose, the statute will not be deemed constitutional.91  Conversely, if 
there is a legitimate local purpose, an acceptable degree of burden a state 
places on interstate commerce will depend on “the nature of the local 
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a 
lesser impact on interstate activities.”92 
III. BALANCED OR UNBALANCED? WHY THE TCCWNA FAILS PIKE 
This section analyzes whether the TCCWNA’s Section 16 violates 
the dormant Commerce Clause by failing the Pike balancing test.93  Since 
the TCCWNA regulates even-handedly, Part A explores whether the 
TCCWNA serves a legitimate New Jersey state interest.94  Part B 
addresses whether the burden imposed by the TCCWNA on interstate 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the nature of the benefit it 
provides New Jersey.  Part C examines whether New Jersey’s interests 
 
 87  See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 
573, 579 (1986) (“When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate 
commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, 
we have generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.”) (emphasis added); North 
Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 88  Envtl. Tech. Council, 98 F.3d at 785. 
 89  Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579.  The court examined whether the 
State’s interest being promoted by the statute was legitimate, rather than striking the statute 
down without inquiry.  Id. 
 90  Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. 
 93  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-16 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 
328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24); see also Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 94  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-18 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 
328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24) (the TCCWNA contains no language that discriminates against 
out-of-state sellers). 
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“could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”95 
A. Consumer Protection is a Legitimate State Interest 
The United States Supreme Court and other federal courts have 
repeatedly asserted the importance of consumer protection.96  Court 
decisions from across the United States have established that state 
governments possess a legitimate interest in safeguarding its citizens 
against dangerous products, fraud, deceptive advertising, and unfair 
business practices that can cause harm.97  Therefore, New Jersey has a 
legitimate state interest in protecting its consumers, which it may seek to 
serve by enacting the TCCWNA. 
The TCCWNA’s sponsor statement demonstrates that the New 
Jersey Legislature hoped that, by enacting the statute, it would prevent 
consumer deception and give consumers a legal course of action to assert 
their rights against businesses from whom they purchased products or 
services.98  Preventing consumer deception or consumer fraud is one of 
the foundations of consumer protection law.  Since this is an interest that 
has been upheld as legitimate by courts in the past, the nature of the state 
interest the TCCWNA seeks to protect is legitimate and fulfills the first 
factor established by Pike.99 
B. The Burdens the TCCWNA Places upon Nation-wide Sellers is 
Clearly Excessive in Relation to the Benefits New Jersey 
Consumers Receive 
After determining whether a statute serves a legitimate State interest, 
the next step in the Pike balancing test is to see if the burden the statute 
places on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to putative 
local benefits.100 
i. Potential Inconsistent Regulation is a Burden that is Clearly 
 
 95  Id. 
 96  See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 349 (“States 
possess ‘broad powers’ to protect local purchasers from fraud and deception . . . .”); Clark v. 
Citizens of Humanity, LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1206 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (“[T]here is a 
legitimate state interest in combating deceptive advertising . . . .”). 
 97  See Penn Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Trane, U.S., Inc., No. 15-cv-2320, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 170731, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2015) (“New Jersey has a strong interest in deterring 
the manufacture and distribution of defective products from this State.”); see also Hunt, 432 
U.S. at 349; Monster Bev. Corp. v. Herrera, EDCV 13-00786-VAP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
189315, at *18 (C.D. Cal Dec. 16, 2013) (“The state has an important interest in protecting 
consumers from unfair and deceptive business practices.”) 
 98  Supra note 31. 
 99  Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 100  Id. 
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Excessive 
State laws have been invalidated under the dormant Commerce 
Clause even when they appear to have been “genuinely 
nondiscriminatory, in the sense that they did not impose disparate 
treatment on similarly situated in-state and out-of-state interests, where 
such laws undermined a compelling need for national uniformity in 
regulation.”101  National uniformity in regulation is important because a 
person or business might be subject to “haphazard, uncoordinated, and 
even outright inconsistent regulation” by a State and therefore, an actor, 
even those acting in good faith, might not realize it is violating a 
statute.102 
Courts determine whether an undermining of “national uniformity 
in regulation” is taking place by evaluating the practical effect of the 
statute. 103  Courts do this by considering the consequences of the statute 
itself and how it may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of 
other states.104  Courts consider what could occur if not one, but many, if 
not all, states adopted similar legislation.105  Courts perform this task 
because they want to protect against inconsistent legislation arising from 
the protrusion of one state regulatory regime into another state’s 
jurisdiction.106 
On its face, the TCCWNA is a nondiscriminatory statute.  Even 
though only five out of the thirty TCCWNA class action lawsuits 
addressing online retailer’s terms and conditions have been filed against 
companies that are headquartered in New Jersey, the statute does not 
target out-of-state sellers, nor benefit in-state sellers over them.107  All 
 
 101  Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997).  See also Bibb v. Navajo 
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 526-27 (1959) (conflict in state laws governing truck mud 
flaps); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 763-64 (1945) (train 
lengths).  See also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987) (“‘This 
Court’s recent Commerce Clause cases also have invalidated statutes that may adversely 
affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations’”); LEA 
BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.2.3 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing Court’s review of 
conflicting state laws under the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 102  Am. Libr. Assoc. v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  The District Court 
prohibited the intentional use of the Internet “to initiate or engage” in certain pornographic 
communications deemed to be 
“harmful to minors.”  Id. 
 103  Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 297. See also CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 88-89.   
 104  Id. 
 105  Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
 106  Id. 
 107  See Sweeney v. Bed Bath & Beyond LLC, No. 2:16-cv-01927 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 6, 
2016); see also Martinez v. Burlington Stores Inc., No. 1:16-cv-02064 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 13, 
2016); Roldan v. Toys R US, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-01929 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 6, 2016); Luca v. 
Wyndham Worldwide Corp. et al., No. 2:16-cv-00746, (W.D. Pa. filed June 6, 2016); Guzman 
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sellers are treated equally under the TCCWNA.108 
Since the TCCWNA is facially non-discriminatory, the practical 
effect, which includes an analysis of the consequences of the statute and 
its potential interactions with other States’ statutes, must be evaluated 
next.  TCCWNA’s Section 16 requires that if a seller operates in other 
jurisdictions besides New Jersey, its “contract or notice cannot simply 
state in a general, nonparticularized fashion that some of the provisions 
of the contract or notice may be void, inapplicable, or unenforceable in 
some states.”109  Instead, the contract or notice must specifically state 
what exact provisions are void, inapplicable, or unenforceable in New 
Jersey.110 
The consequence is that a website’s terms and conditions can no 
longer be generalized.  To comply with the TCCWNA, an online retailer 
must adjust its terms and conditions to provide for the specific provisions 
that are “void, inapplicable, or enforceable” every time it sells a product 
to a New Jersey consumer.111 
The TCCWNA’s potential interactions with other States’ statutes 
could be quite costly and burdensome for online retailers engaging in 
interstate commerce.  An online retailer would have to make sure it is 
complying with the TCCWNA’s requirements, while also undertaking a 
separate analysis of every States’ laws to confirm that no statute similar 
 
v. Devils Arena Ent., No. number 2:16-cv-01984 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 8, 2016).  Contra Murphy 
v. Wal-Mart.com USA, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-02629-ES-JAD (D.N.J. filed May 10, 2016) 
(defendant headquartered in Arkansas); Patterson et. al v. Forever 21 Inc., No. number 3:16-
cv-05087-MAS-LHG (D.N.J. filed Nov. 8, 2016) (defendant headquartered in California); 
Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 427, 70 A.3d 544, 549, (N.J. 2013) (defendant 
headquartered in Illinois); Huhn v. Facebook Inc., No. 2:16-cv-03681 (D.N.J. filed June 22, 
2016) (defendant headquartered in California); Braden v. TTI Floor North America Inc., No. 
3:16-cv-00742 (D.N.J filed in Feb. 2016) (defendant headquartered in Ohio); Rubin v. Intuit 
Inc., No. 3:16-cv-02029 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 12, 2016) (defendant headquartered in California); 
Hite et al. v. Lush Cosmetics LLC, No. 1:16-cv-01533 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2016) (defendant 
headquartered in Vancouver, Candada); Farrell et al. v. Sony Corp. of Am. et al., No. 2:16-
cv-04391 (D.N.J. filed July 20, 2016) (defendant headquartered in New York); Silkowski v. 
Apple Inc., No 5:16-cv-02338 (N.D.Cal. filed Apr. 28, 2016) (defendant headquartered in 
California); Russell v. Advance Auto Parts Inc., No. 3:16-cv-02685 (D.N.J. filed May 12, 
2016) (defendant headquartered in Virginia); Braden, et al. v. Staples Inc., Case No. 3:16-cv-
03848 (D.N.J. filed July 1, 2016) (defendant headquartered in Massachusetts); Rubin v. Saks 
Direct Inc., No. 3:16-CV-02197-PGS-LHG (D.N.J. filed Feb. 2016) (defendant 
headquartered in New York);  
 108  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-18 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 
328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24) (nowhere in the TCCWNA does it target business’s outside of 
the state of New Jersey). 
 109  Shelton, 214 N.J. at 427-28. 
 110  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-16 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 
328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24). 
 111  See § 56:12-18. 
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to the TCCWNA already exist.112  If similar statutes do exist, online 
retailers could be faced with “multi-million dollar claims where no harm 
has or may ever occur.113 
After conducting a nation-wide analysis and potentially incurring 
thousands of dollars in legal costs, an online retailer would then have to 
adjust its terms and conditions to comply with each state.  A company 
could accomplish this goal two ways. The first is by purchasing 
geographical identification software and then using that software to tailor 
a website’s terms and conditions for that specific consumer’s location. 114  
Geographical identification software is used to correctly ascertain the 
locations of its online consumers.  Unfortunately, this software is not only 
costly, but it can also be evaded by consumers.115 
One way geographical identification software can be evaded is 
through cellphone applications. Consumers who purchase products on 
their cellphones can install applications or “apps” such as “Fake GPS” 
and “Location Mockup” to hide their current locations.116  These apps are 
easy to use and inexpensive.117  To hide her location, a user only has to 
turn off her phone’s GPS and location services, and then use the app to 
manually specify what location she wants to pretend to be in.118  Once a 
new location is set, geographical identification software will not be able 
 
 112  See Motion to Dismiss at 12:7-9, Silkowski v. Apple Inc., No 5:16-cv-02338 (N.D.Cal. 
filed Apr. 28, 2016). 
 113  Id. 
 114  PUBLIC POLICY DIVISION, SOFTWARE & IND. INFO. ASS’N, GEOLOCATION TOOLS AND 
GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET SEGMENTATION 2 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docume 
nts/public_comments/2014/04/00010-89273.pdf (“Websites and online content providers 
often use technical means to ascertain the geographical location of potential visitors.  They 
do this for a variety of socially beneficial purposes, including localizing content, fighting 
online fraud and complying with local laws and regulations.”). 
 115  See, e.g., Janet Smith, Agilent Technologies’ New Geolocation Software Maps Emitter 
Location Using RF Sensor Networks, AGILENT (May 1, 2009), http://www.agilent.com/about/ 
newsroom/presrel/2009/01may-em09081.html (“Pricing for a complete geolocation system, 
including sensors and required software, starts at less than $150,000.  The Agilent N6841A 
RF Sensor is available now with deliveries in June. Pricing starts at $13,351.”); KEYSIGHT 
TECH., KEYSIGHT N6854A GEOLOCATION SYSTEM - CONFIGURATION GUIDE 8 (2016) http://lite 
rature.cdn.keysight.com/litweb/pdf/5991-2939EN.pdf (stating that Key Sight’s geolocation 
software costs $1,500 for one year and $3,000 for two years). 
 116  See Darien Graham-Smith, How to: Surf the Web from a Fake Location, PC & TECH 
AUTH. (Jul. 21, 2014, 12:47PM), http://www.pcauthority.com.au/Feature/390138,how-to-surf 
-the-web-from-a-fake-location.aspx. 
 117  Id.  After searching the iPhone’s “App Store” for location hiding apps, the most 
expensive app was $5.00.  However, most of the apps were either free, $0.99, or $2.99.  On 
Android, location hiding apps were all free. See https://play.google.com/store/apps/similar?id 
=com.hide.me&hl=en (last visited May 10, 2018). 
 118  Id. 
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to identify where  a consumer is shopping from.119 
Consumers using computers have a variety of options to hide their 
whereabouts from geolocation software as well. Consumers can use a 
proxy server to route internet traffic through an international channel, 
usually encrypting a consumer’s data en route.120  A proxy server 
provides a user with a virtual private network (VPN) service, which 
allows subscribers to attain an Internet Protocol address or IP address 
from any location a VPN service provides.121  Consumers can also use 
Domain Name System or DNS segmentation, which allows a user to 
change his location, or TOR, which is a network that allows anonymous 
browsing, to hide his true location.122 
The second way a company could comply with the requirements of 
the TCCWNA and potential statutes like it is by making a single terms 
and conditions that would encompass all the requirements in each of the 
fifty states.  This could create terms and conditions that are so lengthy 
and convoluted, consumers would be less willing to read them and might 
have trouble understanding which rights are guaranteed by their 
individual states.  This would run directly contrary to the original 
intention of the TCCWNA, which was to prevent consumer deception 
and raise awareness about consumer rights.123 
Therefore, if other states adopted statutes similar to the TCCWNA, 
it would be financially disastrous for online retailers.  Online retailers 
would be forced to incur significant legal costs and compliance fees to 
combat a statute that does not require plaintiffs to demonstrate harm.  
Unfortunately, even if these online retailers did put in a good faith effort 
to comply, consumers could still skirt terms and conditions specifically 
tailored to their states or be overwhelmed by a website’s terms and 
conditions that encompasses all the legal nuances of each individual state.  
This is why national uniformity is essential to prevent online retailers 
from being exposed to “haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright 
inconsistent regulation” that could potentially cost them millions of 
dollars, but to also protect consumers by making sure they are fully aware 
of their rights.124 
 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Id.; see also What is a VPN?, WHATISMYIP.COM, https://www.whatismyip.com/what-
is-a-vpn/ (last visited May 10, 2018). 
 122  Graham-Smith, supra note 116. 
 123  Assem. B. 1660, 199 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1980). 
 124  Am. Libr. Assoc. v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (prohibiting the 
intentional use of the Internet “to initiate or engage” in certain pornographic communications 
deemed to be “harmful to minors”). 
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ii. The Nature of New Jersey’s Interest, Consumer’s Knowledge 
of Their Existing Rights, Does Not Overcome the 
Excessive Burden Placed Upon Sellers Engaging in 
Interstate Commerce 
Once a court determines that there is a legitimate state interest, an 
acceptable degree of burden a state places on interstate commerce will 
depend on the nature of the state’s interest.125  Under the TCCWNA’s 
Section 16, the nature of New Jersey’s interest is knowledge. By enacting 
the statute, New Jersey sought to protect its consumers and prospective 
consumer’s knowledge of their existing rights.  It hoped that by 
preventing sellers from using clauses such as “void where prohibited” 
more, New Jersey consumers would be aware of their rights and 
ultimately enforce them if need be.126 
However, the TCCWNA’s means do not arguably achieve its end.  
Under the TCCWNA’s Section 16, if a seller is using a contract, notice, 
or sign in multiple jurisdictions, it must specify which provisions 
contained within are or are not enforceable in New Jersey.127  
Alternatively, if a consumer contract, notice, or sign is created only for 
use in New Jersey and controlled by New Jersey law, the specification 
requirement in Section 16 does not apply.128  The specification 
requirement makes a website’s terms and conditions, which are already 
incredibly lengthy and convoluted, even more difficult to read and 
understand for New Jersey current and prospective consumers. 
Currently, because of the length and legalese contained within these 
agreements, it takes an average internet user about forty minutes to read 
the terms and conditions related to the different services that he or she 
may use throughout a single day.129  That means a user could realistically 
spend ten days a year reading websites’ terms and conditions. 
However, this data assumes that users actually read a website’s 
terms and conditions.  Researchers in a 2016 study presented students 
with a terms and conditions agreement to read and review, and out of the 
543 students only twenty five percent even looked at them before 
accepting.130  Additionally, on average, those students who did look at 
 
 125  Id. 
 126  Assem. B. 1660, 199 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1980). 
 127  See supra note 73. 
 128  See supra note 75. 
 129  Shankar Vedantam, Do You Read Terms Of Service Contracts? Not Many Do, 
Research Shows, HIDDEN BRAIN (Aug. 23, 2016), http://npr.org/2016/08/23/491024846/do-y 
ou-read-terms-of-service-contracts-not-many-do-research-shows. 
 130  JONATHAN A. OBAR & ANNE OELDORF-HIRSCH, THE BIGGEST LIE ON THE INTERNET: 
IGNORING THE PRIVACY POLICIES AND TERMS OF SERVICE POLICIES OF SOCIAL NETWORKING 
SERVICES 7, 15 (2016). 
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the agreement did so for only about one minute.131  Since terms and 
conditions are usually thousands of words long and over ten pages, to 
fully read an agreement would take much more than one minute.132  One 
such illustration of this point is Apple’s iTunes terms and conditions.  The 
iTunes agreement currently contains 6,701 words and is sixteen pages 
long.133  A recent study found that it took 193 minutes to read through 
iTunes’ entire terms and conditions.134  Thus, reading the agreement for 
one minute would only create for a consumer a minimal understanding of 
his or her rights. 
Since there is evidence that very few people look or read a website’s 
terms and conditions, New Jersey’s interest in promoting consumer 
awareness about legally established rights is not being adequately 
achieved by the TCCWNA.  Furthermore, putting New Jersey specific 
provisions into a contract, notice, or advertisement with a multi-state 
reach is most likely not raising consumer awareness.  In fact, by including 
these additional provisions in a website’s terms and conditions, it 
increases the agreements length and makes it even more likely that a 
consumer or prospective consumer would agree to the terms without 
reading them.  Therefore, since Section 16 of the TCCWNA is 
counterintuitive to its own interest, the burden it creates upon interstate 
commerce through potential inconsistent regulation should be deemed by 
courts as clearly excessive under the Pike balancing test.135 
C. New Jersey’s Interest in Raising Consumer Rights Awareness 
Could Be Promoted in a Manner Less Impactful on Interstate 
Commerce 
Access to information and openness to procedures is important to 
establish consumer autonomy, and New Jersey has a legitimate interest 
to ensure that its consumers are aware of their rights.136  However, there 
 
 131  Id. at 16. 
 132  See, e.g., Terms and Conditions, TARGET, http://www.target.com/c/terms-conditions/-
/N-4sr7l (last visited May 10, 2018) (8,447 words and eighteen pages long); Terms of Use, 
WALMART, http://help.walmart.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/8/~/walmart.com-terms-of-use 
(last visited May 10, 2018) (6,503 words and sixteen pages long); Macy’s Terms and 
Conditions of Purchase Orders, MACY’S, https://www.macysnet.com/mdocweb/documents.a 
spx?id=1741 (last visited May 10, 2018) (9,419 words and twenty pages long). 
 133  See Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal 
/internet-services/itunes/us/terms.html (last visited May 10, 2018). 
 134  Rick Noack, How Long Would It Take To Read the Terms of Your Smartphone Apps? 
These Norwegians Tried It Out, WASH. POST (May, 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.c 
om/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/28/how-long-would-it-take-to-read-the-terms-of-your-sm 
artphone-apps-these-norwegians-tried-it-out/?utm_term=.cd12d2fd266a. 
 135  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 136  See supra Section III.B.2. 
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are other means that are less impactful on interstate commerce to achieve 
the same goal. 
First, the TCCWNA could be amended to prohibit consumers or 
prospective consumers from using it TCCWNA to bring class action 
claims.  This leaves sellers vulnerable to millions of dollars in civil 
penalties and attorney’s fees that could be financially devastating and 
potentially could raise the cost of services or products for smaller 
companies.137  Therefore, if consumers were barred from bringing 
TCCWNA class actions, sellers with a nationwide reach would not have 
to incur high legal costs if a judgment was found against them for terms 
and conditions that did not even contain a provision harming 
consumers.138 
Second, the TCCWNA could be amended to require ascertainable 
loss to bring a claim.  Currently, consumers are not experiencing an 
economic consequence when a “void where prohibited” provision is 
included in a website’s terms and conditions.139  This is evident in the 
amount of TCCWNA claims that are currently being dismissed in federal 
courts for failing to meet the heightened standing requirements 
introduced by the United States Supreme Court in Spokeo v. Robinson.140  
Under Spokeo, plaintiffs need to show “injury in fact” and the injury 
needs to demonstrate “concrete and particularized harm.”141  Since 
plaintiffs are not alleging any economic damages, their injury is not 
concrete.142 Thus, New Jersey is not protecting consumers through the 
TCCWNA because plaintiffs bringing claims under the statute are not 
being harmed.143  Overall, amending the TCCWNA to include an 
ascertainable loss requirement would further New Jersey’s goals of 
protecting consumers from deceptive practices without burdening sellers 
engaging in interstate commerce. 
Finally, if New Jersey lawmakers are concerned about protecting 
consumer’s knowledge of their existing rights, they could enact a statute 
 
 137  Id. 
 138  See supra Section III.B.1. 
 139  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-16 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 
325, 328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24).  
 140  See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 as revised (2016); see also Russell 
v. Croscill Home, No. 16-cv-1190, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159787, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 
2016) (dismissed for failure to demonstrate a “concrete and particularized harm”); Hecht v. 
Hertz, No. 16-cv-1485, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145589, at *10-11 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2016) 
(dismissed); Candelario v. Rip Curl, No. 16-cv-00963, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163019, at *8 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2016) (dismissed). 
 141  Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
 142  Id. at 1548. 
 143  United Consumer Fin. Servs. Co. v. Carbo, 982 A.2d 7, 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2009). 
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that regulates the formation of terms and conditions in order to make them 
more consumer friendly.  Currently, terms and conditions are not being 
read by consumers or prospective consumers because of their length and 
convoluted language.144  If sellers were required to simplify their terms 
and conditions, it may encourage more consumers to read and take 
advantage of their rights, which aligns better with the New Jersey 
legislature’s original intentions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When the TCCWNA was enacted in 1982, the New Jersey 
legislature did not envision what effects the statute would have on e-
commerce.145  Currently, plaintiffs, many times the same ones, are taking 
advantage of unsuspecting out-of-state sellers who conduct business 
online.146  Federal courts have attempted to intervene by dismissing 
TCCWNA claims for not meeting Article III standing requirements under 
Spokeo.147  However, the TCCWNA also violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause because the statute discriminates against interstate commerce 
through its practical effect. 
A court can come to this conclusion by applying the balancing test 
established in Pike v. Bruce Church.148  The test states: “Where the statute 
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, 
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive 
in relation to the putative local benefits.”149 The degree of burden on 
interstate commerce that will be tolerated depends on the nature of the 
local interest involved and if there was a way for a state to achieve the 
same goals with a lesser impact on interstate commerce.150 
For the TCCWNA, the local public interest, consumer protection, is 
legitimate.151 However, the nature of the interest, raising consumer 
awareness about pre-existing rights, is defeated by the TCCWNA 
itself.152  Section 16 of the TCCWNA requires a seller who operates in 
multiple jurisdictions to clearly specify in its consumer contracts, notices, 
 
 144  Vedantam, supra note 129. 
 145  Peter H. Lewis, Attention Shoppers: Internet Is Open, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/12/business/attention-shoppers-internet-is-open.html. 
 146  Supra note 27.  
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 151  See supra Section III.A. 
 152  See supra Section III.B.2. 
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or advertisements which provisions may or may not be void.153 However, 
studies show that consumers and prospective consumers either do not 
look at a website’s terms and conditions or, if they do, only read them for 
as little as one minute.154  Some terms and conditions, such as Apple’s 
iTunes, require over three hours of reading.155  Therefore, requiring 
sellers to specify provisions for New Jersey consumers only lengthens 
these terms and conditions that consumers are already ignoring because 
of their size and convoluted language.156 If there is no legitimate local 
purpose, the statute will not be deemed constitutional.157 
Additionally, sellers who engage in commerce in multiple 
jurisdictions have the burden of navigating inconsistent regulation, 
something the United States Supreme Court has not tolerated in the 
past.158  Because of the TCCWNA’s burdens, sellers may need to incur 
great legal costs in order to comply with similar laws across the United 
States that may have different standards for their consumers’ terms and 
conditions.159  Finally, New Jersey’s interests could be protected with a 
lesser impact on interstate commerce if it did not allow class actions and 
required ascertainable loss under the statute, or if it enacted a statute 
requiring terms and conditions to be more consumer friendly in order to 
promote awareness of pre-existing rights.160 For all of these reasons, the 
TCCWNA fails the Pike balancing test and violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause.161 
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